MENTAL PATHOLOGY. It is obvious that physiological psychology cannot be expected to attain that scientific definitiveness characteristic of the more physical departments of philosophical investigation. The relations between the mind and the brain can probably be never determined with scientific precision, the obstacles to such a result being very conceivable. Whilst our researches into purely physical conditions educe facts and circumstances that strike observers with a certain exactness and uniformity, the phenomena of mind?of consciousness?are very often but imperfectly apprehended; and even when these latter are sufficiently distinct and clear to admit of notation and record, their significance, in the estimation of inquirers, is by no means uniform. Thus, whilst science in general, including the inferior branches of physiology, has of late years progressed with giant strides, a physiology of brain and mind that commands universal acquiescence has not nearly been attained. In order to realize a system of analytical psychology that should stand in obvious relation with a doctrine of the cerebral functions, we ought to be able to note the varying phases of consciousness in their outward manifestations with some such readiness and facility as that with which we estimate physical conditions. Were this within our power, we might go far to the accomplishment of a truly scientific psychology, based upon our knowledge of the structure and offices of the brain. The inevitable want of an objective standard to measure the value of mental facts, causes them to be devoid of satisfactory comparability : hence, psychical phenomena admit of no perfect system of classification; and, with still less exactitude, can they be compared with physical facts and conditions. Yet scientific induction demands complete and obvious recognition of the comparable worth NO 
